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The threat of smuggled nuclear/radiological weapons and material in commercial con-
tainerized cargo remains a significant threat to global security more than a decade after the
enactment of laws in the United States and elsewhere mandating interdiction efforts. While
significant progress has been made towards deploying passive radiation detection systems
in maritime ports, such systems are incapable of detecting shielded threats or even certain
scenarios in which material is unshielded. Research efforts towards developing systems for
detecting such threats have typically focused on the development of systems that are highly-
specific to nuclear/radiological threats and no such systems have been widely deployed.
While most existing commercially-available cargo radiography systems are not specifically
designed for this interdiction task, if items resembling nuclear/radiological threats are suffi-
ciently rare in cargo radiographs to limit false alarms to an acceptably low frequency, then
a smuggling interdiction scheme based on existing technology may be feasible. This analysis
characterizes the relevant nuclear and radiological threats that may evade detection by pas-
sive monitors, and utilizes a dataset of 122,500 stream-of-commerce cargo container images
from a 6 MeV endpoint gamma radiography system to determine the frequency at which
objects of similar size and density to such threats occur in containers. It is found that for a
broad class of threats, including assembled fission devices, gamma radiography is sufficient
to flag threats in this cargo stream at false positive rates of .2%.
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2The detection of smuggled nuclear and radiological materials and weapons in maritime cargo containers
remains an unsolved problem, despite focused research and political discussion on the issue that intensified
significantly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and continues today. While cargo containers are
not the only method that a terrorist could use to deliver the weapons or materials necessary for an attack,
smuggling via maritime cargo is considered particularly threatening due to the fact that most containers
are loaded overseas and the combination of the large size of cargo containers with the high volume of cargo
traffic (∼5·104 containers/day in the US alone) provide an ideal environment for concealing contraband
[1, 2].
Estimates of the immediate economic costs alone of a nuclear explosion in a major United States port
exceed $1 trillion [3, 4], while even a much smaller-scale attack involving a radiological dispersal device
(RDD, or “dirty bomb”) could incur costs of up to tens of billions of dollars if trade is significantly
disrupted [5]. For these reasons, the United States government continues to pursue programs with the
stated goal of inspecting 100% of US-bound cargo containers for the presence of nuclear weapons, or
the special nuclear materials (SNM) required to make a nuclear weapon, prior to embarkation of the
containers at foreign ports as mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act in 2007 [6]. Progress towards
achieving this goal, however, has been hampered by the challenges of implementing systems in foreign
ports with limited cooperation and financial support from local governments [7–9], a lack of clear and
effective goals for development of technological solutions [1, 9–13], and reluctance from shippers and port
operators to implement inspection regimes that delay shipments or incur additional shipping costs [14–16].
A number of techniques have been proposed for the detection of smuggled nuclear materials and
weapons, although only two main classes of systems have been widely deployed: passive radiation de-
tectors and gamma/x-radiography scanners. Passive detectors, while capable of detecting a variety of
threatening radioactive materials, may be defeated by surrounding the smuggled object with enough
material (“shielding”) to absorb the radiation before it leaves the container. Radiography of containers,
which is capable of producing high resolution images of containers for both manual and automated inspec-
tion, has been widely deployed for a variety of security applications [17]. Generally, however, radiography
alone has been considered insufficient for the detection of nuclear and radiological threats due to a lack
of specific signatures for such threats, even in dual-energy systems that provide limited material-type
identification [18]. This has led to considerable research efforts to develop systems that can produce
specific signatures for SNM. Concepts for such systems have included the detection of prompt neutrons
from photofission [19], nuclear resonance fluorescence [20], and a variety of others [21]. Due to the novelty,
complexity, and cost of these systems none have been deployed widely.
Given the difficulty and costs of developing and deploying highly-specific nuclear/radiological threat
detection systems, it is worthwhile to examine the capabilities of the existing commercial systems (i.e.,
passive radiation detectors and gamma radiography systems) to determine the extent of their capabilities
so as to prioritize future effort and spending in this area. Specifically, given that passive radiation scanning
is capable of detecting many classes of unshielded nuclear/radiological threats [2, 22] and that the materials
required to shield an object from detection will be apparent in a radiograph [23–26], the question arises
as to whether objects in cargo resembling threats (according to their signatures in these systems) are
sufficiently rare so as to permit an interdiction system relying primarily on these existing technologies.
To address this question, this analysis characterizes the relevant nuclear and radiological smuggling threats
and examines data from radiographic images of 122,500 stream-of-commerce cargo containers to determine
the frequency of objects in the cargo which appear consistent with nuclear/radiological threats. To this
end, the radiography system was modeled so as to allow prediction of the radiographic appearance of
typical nuclear/radiological threats in terms of their effective size and density and the entire image set
was analyzed to determine the frequency of such objects. Assuming that the cargo stream contained
none of the objects under consideration, this frequency amounts to the false alarm rate of an interdiction
system using the methods of this analysis. It was found that, in this container stream, radiography is
capable of distinguishing a large class of relevant threats with a false positive rate of .2%.
3CLASSIFYING RELEVANT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
This analysis utilizes the fact that nuclear materials are typically characterized by two key character-
istics: high density (ρ &18 g/cm3) and high atomic numbers (ZU = 92, ZPu = 94). Similarly, due to
the necessarily high level of radioactivity of an effective RDD, any RDD that successfully evades passive
detection will likely require significant amounts of dense, high-Z shielding or a combination of low- and
high-Z shielding to capture neutron radiation [2, 22]. While an ideal system would detect even trace
amounts of material present in a container, the large size of containers and high-volume of cargo traffic
would likely make such a system prohibitively costly and disruptive to trade. Thus, it is necessary to
set reasonable detection goals and to properly assess the capabilities of existing and proposed systems of
reaching these goals by comparison to data from actual stream-of-commerce containers. The two main
classes of threats and their passive detectability are discussed here to establish criteria for the analysis of
the image set.
Nuclear Devices and Special Nuclear Materials
The detection of an assembled, detonable nuclear warhead in a cargo container is clearly a minimum
requirement of any interdiction system, but detection of smuggling of highly enriched uranium (HEU),
weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), or other SNM intended for incorporation into weapons is also highly
desirable. While it is generally considered that significant samples of WGPu are detectable by passive
radiation monitors due to their strong fission neutron signature (or otherwise would be surrounded by very
significant shielding), HEU produces very little passive radiation that would be likely to reach detectors
[2, 22, 27–29]. Thus, it is important to consider how the assembled “physics packages” of weapons would
appear in a radiograph (since these represent the minimum assembly required for nuclear detonation) as
well as smaller samples of SNM alone (especially in the case of HEU). Due to the nature of SNM, these
samples are still most likely to appear as anomalous dense regions in radiographs. Previous efforts have
used 100 cm3 (∼2 kg) as a detection goal [26], which will used as a lower-bound test case in this analysis.
Ultimately, the lower thresholds for SNM detection should be informed by knowledge of the processes
used to construct weapons, information regarding smuggling incidents [30], and information from datasets
such as the one considered in this work.
Radiological Dispersion Devices and Radioactive Sources
Regarding the detection of a radiological dispersion device (or a radioactive sample that could be used
in such a weapon), it is assumed in this work that currently deployed radiation portal monitors are at least
as functional as the specified standards [29]. Under this assumption, any attempt to smuggle a quantity
of radioactive material that poses and significant threat and is unlikely to be detected by passive monitors
would require shielding. Since a strong radioactive source may be quite small1, shielding scenarios on
the scale of centimeters must be considered, although a dispersal weapon such as a dirty bomb would
likely be considerably larger and thus require commensurately more shielding. Thus, in this analysis of
radiography data, searches for RDDs are considered as searches for the shielding that would be required
to hide them from passive detection.
1 For instance, the possible RDD isotope cobalt-60 has a specific activity of 44 TBq/gram (1100 Ci/g).
4OCCURRENCE OF THREAT-RESEMBLING OBJECTS IN RADIOGRAPHIC IMAGES OF A
COMMERCIAL CARGO STREAM
Given the capabilities of passive radiation detection systems already in widespread use at ports, the
problem of detecting nuclear and radiological threats reduces to detecting objects with sufficiently low
radioactivity to be evade detection in feasible passive scanning scenarios. Such a sample may have
naturally low passive radioactivity (such as HEU) or be encased in shielding to mask the signal. As noted
in the previous section, a smuggler seeking to conceal a highly radioactive (O(TBq)) object using shielding
must use significant amounts of material that will appear as large, dense regions in radiographic images.
For threats in involving SNM, while the materials typically emit less radiation than RDD isotopes and
thus may require less shielding to avoid passive detection, a substantial quantity of SNM will also appear
as a dense region in a radiograph. Since radiographic systems fundamentally measure the attenuation
of a beam due to the material in a container as a 2D function of position, they are naturally suited for
identifying objects by these parameters.
While utilizing radiography to search for dense objects has been proposed previously as a mechanism
for searching for nuclear and radiological threats in cargo [23–26], such a technique is feasible only if
objects of the relevant densities and sizes are sufficiently rare in radiographs so as to not produce a large
number of false alarms. To avoid disruption of the flow of containers in ports, cargo security schemes
have typically sought to flag .3% of containers as containing items consistent with threats [16, 26].
Additional inspection and/or intelligence information may provide more leeway, but likely at most a
few percent of containers can feasibly be flagged for further inspection. Previous data have provided
information regarding the mean density of entire cargo containers [31, 32], but such studies underestimate
the occurrence of dense cargoes (due to the averaging of dense regions with empty regions) and provide
no information regarding the frequency of contiguous dense regions that resemble threats. This analysis
characterizes the expected appearance of threatening nuclear/radiological objects in radiographs and
examines a large set of high-resolution radiographic images from a 6 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung
imaging system to identify the frequency of such objects. If such objects are sufficiently rare, then,
in conjunction with passive scanning to detect unshielded threats, radiography is likely sufficient for
identifying important classes of nuclear/radiological threats.
Image Dataset
The analysis was conducted on a set of 122,500 radiographs of intermodal cargo containers, approxi-
mately evenly split between 20 foot and 40 foot containers, produced by a Rapiscan Eagle R60® scanner
[33, 34] examining rail car-borne containers entering a European port. The container stream represented
a diverse array of cargo, and approximately 20% of the containers were empty [35]. Each image consisted
of a two-dimensional array of 16-bit pixels representing the integrated energy transmission (measured by
CdWO4 detectors) of a 6 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung beam through the cargo relative to the open
beam2. Each pixel represented an approximately 5 × 5 mm region on the mid-plane of the container
transverse to the beam3.
This image set was previously analyzed in the context of using machine learning techniques to iden-
tify complex objects such as vehicles in cargo images [35–37]. The analysis was conducted on images
preprocessed according to the methods discussed in Section 7.2.2 of Reference [35], which trimmed the
images to remove blank space around the containers and corrected for known system artifacts in the
images. Additionally, for this analysis the images were further trimmed to remove any portion of the rail
2 The dataset also included 4 MeV endpoint images for each container, which were also analyzed but are not discussed in
this work due to the lesser penetration of the lower energy beam.
3 Due to the “fan” shape of the beam created by the vertical collimation of the gamma rays, objects on the near side of the
container to the source will appear larger in the vertical direction than objects closer to the detectors. For this analysis, it
is assumed that any threatening objects are near the center of the container since a smuggler would not have knowledge
of the orientation in which a container is inspected and since this placement is most advantageous for shielding the object
from passive detection.
5car present in the image. Any images with resulting sizes inconsistent with the expected container sizes
or otherwise anomalous data were excluded from the analysis. These images constituted ∼3.1% of the
available images, and are not counted in the 122,500 total.
Analysis
The analysis sought to test the hypothesis that radiological and nuclear threats may be detected in
radiographic images of cargo containers by identifying them by their anomalous size and density relative
to common cargo. To accomplish this, the radiographic system was modeled so as to allow the simulation
of images of threatening objects and to characterize their appearance in images. The cargo images were
analyzed for the presence of contiguous dense regions and the frequency of regions matching the parameters
of the simulated threats was examined. If the occurrence of threat-like objects in the cargo stream is
sufficiently small (O(1%)), then radiography provides a stronger tool for detecting nuclear/radiological
threats than previously has been appreciated. Additionally, a number of other results regarding the
distribution and density of materials in containers follow from the analysis, which provide useful data for
various studies in cargo threat detection.
Radiographic System Model
Due to the high intensity of photons in a bremsstrahlung radiography system, the detectors are oper-
ated in charge summing mode (in which the signal is roughly proportional to the total energy deposited
in a detector over an integration time window), rather than counting mode (in which individual photons
and their deposited energies are detected). The fundamental quantity measured by the system for a given
material in the beam is the transmission ratio (scaled to the 16-bit dynamic range of the detectors for
the Eagle R60® system)
Tmat =
(
216 − 1) Qmat
Qair
, (1)
where Qmat is the charge sum for a fixed period with the material in the beam and Qair is the sum for an
equivalent period with no intervening material. In practice, radiographic systems like the one described
in this study have dynamic calibration mechanisms to account for variations in the beam and detectors
to ensure proper normalization between Qmat and Qair [17, 33, 34]. The detected charge sum may be
modeled as
Q = C
∑
j
Ej
(
DM~b
)
j
+N(Q), (2)
where C is a proportionality constant, ~b is a vector representing a histogram of the bremsstrahlung beam
spectrum as a function of photon energy (with bin energies Ej), M is the matrix representing the effect
of the material on the transmitted beam (such that M~b is the transmitted spectrum histogram), D is
the detector response matrix (such that DM~b would be the detected spectrum histogram if the detector
could be operated in photon counting mode), and N(Q) is a noise term that in general depends on Q.
Models for each of these quantities for the system and a full range of materials were developed using
simulations based on the Geant4 framework [38] and photon cross section data [39], the details of which
are described in Section A1. Since this analysis examines only average behavior over many pixels, the
noise term (which may arise from counting statistics, electronics noise, etc.) is treated as a net effect on
the reconstructed value of Tmat as described in Section A1 6.
Rather than work with the transmission ratio T , it is customary in radiography to compare cargoes of
different materials to the equivalent thickness of steel that would result in the same value of T . Using the
6previously mentioned models, a look-up table was created for each elemental material to map amounts of
a given material to centimeters of steel at equivalent T . This is described in more detail in Section A1 5.
This conversion was used to compute the effective object sizes in Table I and is utilized for all further
discussions of imaged cargo. For a more detailed discussion of cargo radiography, see Reference [17].
Dense Object Finding
To measure the occurrence of dense objects in cargo and their sizes, each image was analyzed for
contiguous regions exceeding given thresholds of steel equivalent thickness ranging from 11 to 30 cm-
steel equivalent. For each image and thickness threshold, the image was converted to a binary image of
above/below threshold and the MATLAB® Image Processing Toolbox was used to identify all distinct
4-connected regions in the image above the threshold [40, 41]. The image toolbox was used to determine
several parameters for each region including the total number of pixels in the region, the geometric
centroid, and the bounding box (smallest rectangle aligned to the image axes that contains the region).
Each distinct 4-connected region was characterized by two parameters for comparison to the expected
sizes of threat-like objects: reff and Aeff. The effective radius reff was defined to be the radius of the largest
circle centered at the centroid contained within the bounding box (scaled to the effective pixel size along
the transverse mid-plane of the container). The effective area Aeff was defined to be the total number of
pixels above threshold in the region times the approximate cross sectional area of a single pixel (∼0.25
cm2). The parameter reff works well for characterizing compact objects, like a small mass of SNM, while
Aeff better represents the material composition of elongated objects. Note that under this definition, the
image of an annular object will result in a value of reff comparable to the outer radius of the object but
with a smaller Aeff than a filled-in circular image of the same radius.
The results of this analysis for a 20 foot container of palletized cargo at two different thresholds are
shown in Figure 1 as an example representative of a cargo type that contains significant dense regions.
Additionally, the figure includes an additional image in which a simulated fission device is inserted into
the image and identified by the algorithm as a large dense region. In the figure, the magenta circles
represent the circle defining reff and the red crosses mark the centroid and total extent of each region.
Characteristic Test Objects
For concreteness in the following discussion, it is useful to define several specific examples of potential
smuggled objects. Since a spherical object minimizes the effective radiographed area from an arbitrary
angle of a given amount of material, the example objects considered here are each spherically symmetric.
While a smuggler could, in principle, machine material and pack a container so as to make an object
thinner along the beam direction and thus appear less dense, this would be difficult or impossible in many
scenarios. For an example, the geometry of an assembled weapon is fixed and changing the configuration
of smuggled materials would increase the amount of shielding required to mask any passive radiation
(making the object appear larger in the radiograph).
The considered objects, summarized in Table I, were chosen so as to broadly represent three classes
of objects: bare masses of SNM, assembled fission packages, and Pb shields that could be used to mask
a small sample of an RDD isotope or HEU. In the first category, near-critical masses of WGPu and
HEU as well as a 100 cm3 mass of material were considered as scenarios in which material is shipped for
incorporation into a weapon after delivery. The critical masses represent the scenario in which enough
material is shipped at once (in theory) to create a weapon, while the 100 cm3 represents a smaller sample
that has been the detection goal of past development efforts [26]. The second category models the fission
packages of the nuclear weapon models described in Fetter, et al. [27] as prototypical representations
of HEU and WGPu weapons. Note that these devices represent only the essential components of a
fission device (i.e., SNM, tamper, neutron reflector, and chemical explosives) and thus a real assembled
7FIG. 1. Sample images of a 20 foot container with palletized cargo two-high stacks for which the analysis described
in the text has been performed to identify contiguous dense regions in the cargo. In the top figure the threshold
is set to 19.5 cm-steel equivalent, just below the average thickness of the pallet stacks (∼20.5 cm-steel equivalent),
and thus the algorithm identifies the individual pallets as the regions above threshold. In the middle image the
threshold is set to 25.6 cm-steel, the value used in this analysis to search for larger objects of interest such assembled
fission weapons (see Table I). At this higher threshold, only small (∼cm-scale) regions are identified, corresponding
to signal noise and/or fluctuations in the uniformity of the cargo. The bottom image uses the 25.6 cm threshold,
but the plutonium weapon test object (Figure A3) has been inserted into the image (accounting for saturation of
the transmission, noise, etc. as described in Section A2) and is clearly identified by the analysis. In each image,
the red crosses mark the total extent of each contiguous region identified by the analysis, while the magenta circle
represents the circle of the effective radius reff. Note that regions with reff < 2 cm are not marked for clarity and
that not all pixels contained in the extent or circle of a given region are necessarily above threshold (the region
must only be 4-connected).
8device would likely have additional components that would increase the apparent size of the object in
a radiograph. The third category examines shielding scenarios that could mask small samples of either
RDD isotopes or uranium up to a few inches of Pb encasing a sphere of radius 8.5 cm (so as to fit the HEU
critical sphere). Note that any scenarios involving more shielding or shielding of larger objects would be
necessarily easier to detect via these criteria.
Applying the radiographic system model, the transmission of the beam through each of the test
objects was simulated so as to produce simulated radiographic images of each object. As described in
Section A2, the simulated images were produced with the same pixel size as the data (assuming placement
in the middle of the container). A conservative estimate of the pixel-to-pixel steel equivalent thickness
reconstruction uncertainty as well as a model of the systematic reconstruction variation due to photon
source fluctuations were applied to the simulated images so as to match the characteristics of the data
images. The same dense object finding routine used for the container images, described in the previous
section, was then applied to each test object image to determine the expected reff and Aeff of each object
at practical thresholds chosen for each object. Each of these objects was simulated and analyzed under
the assumption that no additional material was present in the simulated radiographs, and thus the quoted
sizes Table I are minimum estimates since the walls of the container and any other cargo present would
increase the apparent size of the dense region associated with the test object in a radiograph.
TABLE I. Summary of the shielded and unshielded nuclear/radiological threats chosen as typical examples for this
analysis and their expected radiographed sizes at the highest practical density threshold for each object. The first
three objects are spherical masses of SNM, the latter two of which are just below a critical mass [42]. The second
two are the “physics packages” of the prototypical nuclear weapon models described in Fetter, et al. [27]. Each
Pb shielding shell, the third set of objects, has an inner radius just large enough to contain the HEU critical mass
(although no additional material inside). The last item combines the 3 cm Pb shell with the HEU critical mass.
Object Outer Radius Threshold S reff Aeff
(cm) (cm-steel) (cm) (cm2)
100 cm3 SNM 2.9 15.6 1.5 4
WGPu Mcrit 4.5 21.2 2.1 10
HEU Mcrit 8.5 25.6 7.5 166
WGPu Package 21.0 25.6 9.6 272
HEU Package 23.0 25.6 11.7 413
3 cm Pb shell 11.5 21.2 9.8 69
6 cm Pb shell 14.5 25.6 12.6 321
9 cm Pb shell 17.5 25.6 16.0 765
HEU Mcrit + 3 cm Pb 11.5 25.6 8.9 235
Key Results
A number of interesting results regarding the detection of nuclear and radiological threats in commercial
cargo arise from this analysis. Several key distributions from the image set are presented here for discussion
in the next section, while Section A4 presents further results that may be of interest to readers seeking
more information regarding the material distribution inside cargo containers. For the purpose of this
discussion, it is assumed that no objects that would be classified as nuclear/radiological threats were
present in the analyzed images, and thus any object resembling a threat constitutes a false positive.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the effective areal density by pixel of all containers in the image set,
separated by 20 and 40 foot containers, along with the corresponding cumulative distributions. These
distributions provide significantly greater detail than previously presented cargo density distributions
9(such as Figure 6 of Reference [31]), which only provided average information over entire containers
and thus significantly underestimated the occurrence of high areal density regions in containers that are
relevant to identifying nuclear and radiological threats. Notably, a very small fraction of pixels (O(10−5))
exceed the quoted penetration depth of the scanner (∼30 cm-steel equivalent), and thus there are very
few contiguous regions of dense material that appear similar to the test objects. Additionally, 40 foot
containers exhibit many fewer dense pixels than 20 foot containers, which follows naturally from the fact
that 40 foot containers have twice the volume of 20 foot units but only ∼10% higher payload capacity by
weight [43].
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FIG. 2. Distributions of the effective areal density by pixel of the cargo, separated by 20 and 40 foot containers (left
axis) with the corresponding cumulative distributions (right axis) in units of centimeters of steel equivalent. The
peak corresponding to pixels of .0.5 cm-steel equivalent (image pixels in which no material was present between
the container walls) is truncated for clarity; an untruncated version is shown in Figure A6. For these distributions,
the portions of the container images including the container roofs were excluded.
To quantify the fraction of containers that exhibit a region consistent with the test objects, the largest
contiguous region by each of the parameters reff and Aeff at each tested density threshold was identified
for each image (since a container containing at least one object consistent with a threat would be flagged
for further inspection). The fraction of 20 foot containers whose images exhibit a contiguous region above
given density thresholds S larger than reff as a function of reff is presented in Figure 3, while Figure 4
presents the same for the Aeff parameter
4. The fractions of containers containing an object resembling the
4 The same results for 40 foot containers are presented in Figures A4 and A5. Across the entire analysis, 40 foot containers
contain significantly fewer dense objects of all sizes compared to 20 foot containers.
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tests objects (at the selected density thresholds) may be immediately derived from these distributions,
which amount to the false alarm rates for detection of those objects under an inspection scheme following
this analysis. Table II presents these results.
FIG. 3. Fraction of 20 foot container images containing a contiguous region with effective areal density ≥S of
effective radius ≥reff, for several values of S. See Figure A4 for the equivalent figure for 40 foot containers.
Several results are immediately apparent in the Table II results. Each of the assembled fission package
devices are detectable by their effective size in either reff or Aeff at false alarm rates of .2%, as is the
spherical near-critical mass of HEU. These represent some of the most critical detection scenarios since
detection of an assembled nuclear device would necessarily be a minimum requirement of any effective
inspection scheme, while the critical mass of HEU roughly represents an amount of material needed for
a weapon and generally is not detectable using passive radiation monitoring in even unshielded scenarios
[2]. The critical mass of WGPu presents an unacceptably high false alarm rate when searched for using
this method, but due to its strong passive neutron signature would be far more likely to be detected using
existing passive monitoring if unshielded [22]. The addition of shielding or surrounding benign cargo to
any of these scenarios further reduces the false alarm rate due to the additional material increasing the
apparent density and object size, making it highly likely that a highly radioactive RDD could also be
detected by either its passive radiation signature or the radiographic signatures of the large amount of
shielding (multiple cm of Pb) that would be required to mask the passive signature. Notably, however,
the data show that this method alone cannot identify smaller samples of SNM, primarily due to the fact
that a spherical 100 cm3 sample of SNM has a peak steel equivalent thickness of ∼17 cm and thus cannot
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FIG. 4. Fraction of 20 foot container images containing a contiguous region with effective areal density ≥S of cross
sectional area ≥Aeff, for several values of S. See Figure A5 for the equivalent figure for 40 foot containers.
be identified as a region of unexpectedly high density (and in fact appears as a very typical object given
the areal density distributions shown in Figure 2).
Note that the alarm rates presented in Table II are somewhat conservative in that they only examine
the size of the objects in the containers, while any implemented inspection scheme could utilize a number
of extra pieces of information such as location in the container of the identified object, shape of the object,
etc. given sufficient data describing the cargo stream. A straightforward example of this is apparent in
the data: each of the container fraction curves for the highest density thresholds tends to level off at
a constant value (∼0.6–1.8%) before dropping to near zero at a relatively large value of reff or Aeff (for
example ∼0.7% of both 20 and 40 foot containers have a largest object of high density with reff ≈ 55 cm).
Examination of the cargo images reveals that these objects are elements of the container frame that the
image preprocessing failed to remove, and thus could be automatically disregarded in a search for threats.
Such an addition to the inspection scheme could plausibly lower the false alarm rate to below 1% for the
larger test objects, although the high frequency of smaller objects remains well above an acceptable alarm
rate.
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TABLE II. Percentage of 20 foot and 40 foot container radiographs that contain an object of at least the expected
size of each of the test objects listed in Table I by effective radius and cross sectional area.
Object Threshold S 20 ft. by 20 ft. by 40 ft. by 40 ft. by
(cm-steel) reff (%) Aeff (%) reff (%) Aeff (%)
100 cm3 SNM 15.6 89.80 100.00 59.94 100.00
WGPu Mcrit 21.2 40.78 39.99 10.09 10.03
HEU Mcrit 25.6 1.49 2.51 0.87 1.68
WGPu Package 25.6 1.22 2.09 0.85 1.67
HEU Package 25.6 0.86 1.88 0.80 1.66
3 cm Pb shell 21.2 14.94 24.80 1.06 2.13
6 cm Pb shell 25.6 0.84 1.97 0.80 1.67
9 cm Pb shell 25.6 0.76 1.73 0.80 1.63
HEU Mcrit + 3 cm Pb 25.6 1.32 2.17 0.86 1.68
IMPLICATIONS FOR CARGO SECURITY POLICY AND RECOMMENDED FUTURE WORK
This work demonstrates, via the analysis of a set of 122,500 stream-of-commerce cargo container
images, that existing high-energy radiography technology, in conjunction with existing passive scanning
methods, provides a functional means for detecting a broad class of nuclear and radiological threats in
the analyzed container stream. The physical properties of assembled nuclear weapons, masses of SNM
&1 critical mass, and shielded radiological threats sufficiently distinguish them in radiographic images
from the typical contents of cargo to serve as a means of identifying possible threats with false positive
rates .2%. For smaller samples of SNM, more intensive and/or specific screening methods are likely
necessary. Since radiography systems are commercially available, overlap strongly with other customs
inspection goals (e.g., detection of narcotics and stowaways), and can be deployed at lower financial and
operational cost than specialized detection systems, these results suggest that the current development
of highly-specific systems for deterring nuclear smuggling in cargo may merit reassessment. Nuclear
threat detection research continues to primarily focus on novel systems with high specificity that may
be unnecessary if it is sufficient to identify threats by their density and size as is suggested by the data
for this cargo stream. Significant questions remain regarding the fraction of containers that must be
radiographed to deter smugglers in this context [44, 45], the threshold amounts of materials that must be
detected, and the operational challenges associated with deploying more radiography systems in ports.
This analysis suggests that radiography provides a stronger means of detecting nuclear threats than has
been previously appreciated. In particular, this analysis suggests that radiography offers the capability
to detect several relevant classes of threats in the near term without further technology development.
While the previous effort in the United States to widely deploy high energy radiography systems
(CAARS5) and to upgrade passive detection systems at ports failed due to a number of logistical and
technical reasons [1, 46], the conclusions of this work support reassessment of these programs as the
most expedient and cost-effective means of reducing the nuclear/radiological smuggling threat in cargo
streams. While approximately 5% of containers entering the United States are radiographed (having been
selected based on intelligence information regarding the shipment) [47], many of these radiographs are
conducted using lower energy radioactive isotope systems such as VACIS6 that lack sufficient penetration
(.17 cm-steel equivalent) to identify nuclear threats by their density [48]. This suggests that systems
with penetration similar to the of the 6 MeV scanner analyzed here are necessary, but given the extremely
low frequency of cargo with density >30 cm-steel equivalent systems with higher energies, penetration,
and radiation dose are likely not necessary in this context. While the CAARS program and other systems
5 Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System
6 Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
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under development have focused on identifying nuclear materials by their high atomic number [49], which
would further increase the sensitivity of a radiography system to nuclear threats, given the capabilities
of existing radiography systems for threat detection suggested by this analysis expanded deployment of
standard radiography systems may be advisable as more advanced systems are considered. A detection
regime based on this technology would be inadequate for small samples of SNM, such as the 100 cm3
sample targeted by CAARS, and thus careful consideration is required regarding the amounts of material
that inspection schemes are required to detect. Notably, however, given that the 100 cm3 represents a
concentrated amount of material and that the simulated image included no surrounding materials (i.e.,
benign cargo among which the sample is placed), it is possible that in realistic scenarios additional
information may be available to further increase the detectability of such small samples. For instance,
further analysis of this data to examine the degree to which small dense regions occur in isolation or the
use of radiographic systems with multiple imaging angles for 3D reconstruction could provide sufficient
information to better identify objects resembling small SNM samples.
A lack of clear, well-motivated inspection goals has hampered research in this area, but this data
provides critical information regarding the nature of materials in containers to inform future inspection
requirements. Fundamentally, the conclusions from this analysis apply only to the commerce stream
of the analyzed images and are subject to the assumptions of the model used to determine the system
response to the test objects. Other cargo streams may contain a higher frequency of large dense objects
(e.g., a port servicing a nearby mine producing many containers filled with dense ore), and thus may
contain too many objects resembling threats to use radiography in this fashion. Given the encouraging
results of this analysis, however, examination of images from other cargo streams, which have not been
previously made available for public and/or academic investigation, should be pursued to determine the
relevance of these results for other commerce streams. Additionally, actual radiographed images of possible
threatening objects should be utilized to eliminate model uncertainty, although such work may require
a classified setting. While this analysis focused on identifying threats by their size and density alone,
further research on data of this type would likely lead to stronger identification algorithms. Access to
data of this type provides highly useful prior information for the development of algorithms and methods
for analysis of signals for threats, not only in the context of radiography but also in the context of passive
scanning by providing detailed information about the distribution of cargo materials between sources and
detectors [28]. Additionally, using cargo stream data to characterize and catalog benign objects would
further strengthen the capabilities of a radiography-based system to differentiate threats. As scientific
and technical knowledge regarding nuclear and radiological weapons becomes more widespread, and thus
available to potential smugglers, the availability of data to improve detection capabilities and assess
existing and developing technologies becomes more valuable.
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Appendix A1: Modeling of the Eagle R60® Scanner
In order to convert the 16-bit transmission images in the dataset to equivalent amounts of material,
and similarly to compute the expected transmission value in the Rapiscan Eagle R60® scanner for ob-
jects of known materials, the essential components of the radiography system were modeled: namely
the bremsstrahlung beam spectrum, the physics and geometry of the transmission of the beam through
containers mounted on the rail cars passing through the scanner, and the detector response to the trans-
mitted beam as delineated by Equation 2. While not all precise details of the system were available, as
some elements of the system are proprietary, a combination of published information, known performance
specifications of the system, and common functionality between gamma radiography systems allows a
suitable approximation of the system response to different materials (to within ∼1 cm-steel equivalent
over the full penetration range) for the purpose of the this analysis. In particular, because the trans-
mission measurement is fundamentally a ratio between open-beam and material-in measurements under
effectively the same conditions, errors in the model of the beam and detector response are second-order
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effects compared to the effect of the transmission physics in the materials. Each of the key elements of
the model outlined by Equations 1 and 2 are described in the following sections.
1. Setup/Geometry
The system geometry was modeled according the technical specifications from Rapiscan [33], the
additional information in Figure 7.2 of Reference [35], and confirmed against photographs of the deployed
system. Given the fact that the vertical collimation width must be comparable to the resolution of the
images, and is thus a few millimeters, it may be considered negligible in modeling the system. Additionally,
no significant variation in the transmission value corresponding to empty container walls was observed as
a function of height in the container, and thus any effects due to the vertical “fan” spread of the beam
that remained after image preprocessing were also considered as negligible. While rudimentary models of
the system were created for the Geant4 [38] simulations mentioned in the following sections, no element
of the geometry was critical to the ultimate analysis.
2. Bremsstrahlung Beam
Since the precise spectrum of the gamma rays generated by the bremsstrahlung of the Rapiscan
Eagle R60® system was not available, simulation was conducted to produce a suitable approximation.
A Geant4 [38] simulation was constructed in which 6 MeV electrons (which would be produced by the
linear accelerator of the radiography system) were incident on a bremsstrahlung radiator consisting of
5 mm of tungsten backed by 5 cm of copper. The spectrum of resulting gamma rays in a 1 degree vertical
collimation slice forward of the beam direction was recorded and is shown in Figure A1, which was used
as the representation of the beam spectrum histogram in the model (~b in Equation 2).
Note that since this analysis made use only of transmission ratios comparing material-in-beam to the
open beam transmission and since the images in the dataset were preprocessed to correct for variations in
the beam [35], only the approximate shape of the spectrum was required for the analysis rather than its
magnitude and only significant variations in the high energy portion of the spectrum would be likely to
significantly affect results for the transmission ratio. While the absolute beam flux affects the precision
of the transmission measurement (due to variation in the number of photons detected), the uncertainty
on the reconstructed material thickness was estimated from data as described in Section A1 6.
3. Transmission Modeling
The transmission component of the model (M in Equation 2), i.e., the attenuation of the beam due
to materials, was modeled using a simple model of exponential attenuation and the NIST X-Ray Mass
Attenuation Coefficients Database [39], which provide photon attenuation data for all elemental materials
up to Z = 92 and energies of 20 MeV (as well as data and prescriptions for the calculation of data for
compounds of the elements). That is, for a material sample of atomic number Z, density ρ, and thickness
along the beam X, the attenuation of the beam at energy E may be computed as
I
I0
= exp
(
−µZ
ρ
X
)
. (A1)
For compound materials, the attenuation coefficient µ was calculated as [39]
µ
ρ
=
∑
j
(
wj
(
µ
ρ
)
j
)
, (A2)
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FIG. A1. Simulated 6 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung spectrum used for the radiography system model.
where the sum runs over all elements in the compound and the weight wj is the mass fraction of the
jth element. For the calculations involving plutonium, the values of µρ for Z = 94 was approximated
as those of Z = 92 due to the lack of available data in the NIST database. Using this model, for any
material or mix of materials presented to the beam the matrix M may be constructed such that M~b
is the spectrum after the initial beam of spectrum ~b passes through the material. Note that under this
exponential attenuation model, in which detection of scattered beam components is neglected, M is a
diagonal matrix.
This model is effective for the case of the radiography system studied here due to the tight collimation
of the beam. That is, photons reaching the detectors are almost exclusively photons that have undergone
direct transmission, and thus secondary scattering effects that are not captured by the exponential atten-
uation model are not significant. This was verified by conducting several Geant4 [38] simulations of the
system for different materials. The exponential transmission model differed from the Geant4 calculations
by at most ∼0.5 cm-steel equivalent, and thus the exponential model was used for computational efficiency
across all materials.
4. Detectors
The detectors were modeled as 15.0× 4.6× 30.0 mm CdWO4 crystals, which are typical of those used
in gamma radiography systems [17]. In a Geant4 [38] simulation, photons of energies 0–6 MeV were
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impinged along the long axis of the crystal uniformly illuminating the central 5 mm of the second-longest
axis to simulate the collimated beam striking the detector crystal. The matrix D mapping the initial
photon energy to the distribution of resulting energy deposition in the crystal was constructed using
approximately 107 simulated photons. Like the initial bremsstrahlung spectrum, the exact details of the
detectors and their response were not available, but due to the fact that the measurement consists of
a ratio and given the similarities in detectors used across bremsstrahlung radiography systems which
informed the choices for the simulation the approximation used here suffices.
5. Conversion to Steel Equivalent Thickness
With the entirety of the transmission model in place, it is straightforward to convert the transmission
value T calculated for any configuration of material to an equivalent thickness of steel by comparing to
the calculated transmission as a function of steel thickness at standard density (ρsteel ≈ 8 g/cm3). Note
that as the effective atomic number of the material of a given areal density increases, the equivalent areal
density of steel increases as well due to the increasing attenuation of photons in the beam due to increasing
electron-positron pair production cross section as a function of Z. A lookup table as a function of material
thickness was created for each relevant material, which permitted direct conversion of transmission values
to equivalent steel thicknesses for each of the materials.
6. Uncertainty on the Steel Equivalent Measurement
In any radiographic measurement, uncertainty on the transmission measurement (due to the statis-
tics associated with the number of photons that reach the detectors and systematic effects) affects the
reconstructed effective thickness for each pixel. Since the measured equivalent thickness may fluctuate
downward for some of the pixels representing a given object, such fluctuations may decrease the size
of the 4-connected region representing the object. Thus, in order to compare modeled objects to their
representations in the radiographic images, it is necessary to estimate the effects of this reduction in the
size of the 4-connected regions.
To estimate the uncertainty in the measurement of the equivalent steel thickness in the images for each
pixel, a data-driven approach was used to establish an upper bound on the variance of the measurement
as a function of thickness. To do this, each pixel in each image (for a subset of the entire image set
in order to reduce computation time) was compared to its 4-connected neighbors, and the difference in
the reconstructed equivalent thicknesses between each pixel and its neighbors was histogrammed. Under
the assumption that adjacent 4-connected pixels represent very similar elements of the imaged cargo
given the ∼0.5 cm resolution of the pixels, this provides an estimate of the measurement uncertainty but
overestimates the uncertainty since adjacent pixels may in fact represent different cargo thicknesses. For
each equivalent thickness in the range relevant to the image set (i.e., 0–30 cm-steel equivalent in bins of
1 cm), a Gaussian was fit to the spread of the measurements (excluding data from the T = 0 bins) to
determine an upper bound on the measurement uncertainty. The results of this analysis are shown in
Figure A2. The combined statistical and systematic measurement uncertainty was found to be modeled
well by a quadratic polynomial over the range of interest, as shown in the figure. These results were
applied to simulate threatening objects in cargo as described in the following section.
7. Assessing the Validity of the Model
While this model makes a number of assumptions regarding system parameters, the model can be
compared against known features of the data and available specifications of the Eagle R60® system to
assess its validity. In particular, if the exponential attenuation model of the radiography system is valid,
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FIG. A2. Uncertainty on the measured steel equivalent thickness for a single pixel as a function of equivalent steel
thickness with a quadratic polynomial fit.
as has been well established for narrowly-collimated bremsstrahlung radiography, then comparison to two
known data points (i.e., the transmission values for known amounts of known materials) is sufficient to
test the model [17]. Two such points are readily available:
• The largest peak in the pixel-by-pixel density distribution (which is shown without truncation in
Figure A6) corresponds to an empty projection of a container in which the pixel represents the
attenuation of the beam through just the two walls of the container and air. Due to the highly
standardized nature of cargo containers, the total thickness of steel present in the two walls is a
known quantity. The side walls of standard intermodal containers consist of corrugated steel plates
that are 1.6–2.0 mm thick [50]. While the corrugation of the steel causes the amount of steel
presented the beam to vary slightly along the length of the container, the average “empty pixel”
represents 4.3 mm of steel (due to the diagonal portions of the corrugation increasing the presented
wall thickness slightly). The mean of the peak corresponding to the empty pixels in data occurs at
a value of T = 5.59 · 104.
• The manufacturer of the Eagle R60® quotes the steel penetration of the system, i.e., the greatest
thickness of steel behind which additional material would be discernible, as 31.0 cm. Given that
measurements at the low end of transmission are subject to uncertainty as discussed in the previous
section, this value is slightly below the value that would correspond to a measurement of T = 1 (i.e.,
one bit out of 216). From Figure A2, the pixel-to-pixel measurement uncertainty at 31.0 cm-steel
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equivalent is approximately 3.8 cm-steel equivalent (standard deviation). Thus, a measurement of
T = 1 should ideally (under a perfect measurement) corresponds to ∼34.8 cm-steel.
Using the model as described, it is straightforward to compute the expected transmission values for
each of these test cases. For 4.3 mm of steel, the model predicts T = 5.587 · 104, which is in very
good agreement with the data value. Note that due to the exponential nature of the attenuation, the
value of T changes rapidly as a function of steel thickness for such small amounts of material, but even
±1 mm variations in the thickness of the walls lead to changes of .3% in T . Thus, the model successfully
reproduces the data for the case of the empty container walls. At the low-transmission end of the data,
the problem is different in that small changes in the value of T correspond to large changes in the amount
of material. The model predicts that 36.4 cm-steel produces a value of T = 1, which corresponds to a
slight overestimation but is within the uncertainty of the measurement of a single pixel. Thus, given the
known data and the validity of the exponential attenuation model for the system, the model represents
the data well to within O(1cm-steel) across the full range. Due to the uncertainty at the low-transmission
end of the range, the comparisons between test objects and data in the text were conducted at density
thresholds somewhat below the penetration limit of the system (≤25.6 cm-steel) to reduce any possible
effect from model error in this region.
Appendix A2: Calculation of Expected Radiographed Object Sizes
Using the model for the measurement uncertainties described above, each of the test objects listed in
Table I was modeled to create simulated images of the objects with the same resolution, precision, etc.
as would be expected if they were imaged using the Eagle R60® system. First, each object was mapped
to the 5 × 5 mm pixel resolution of the scanner and the material composition of the object along the
projection of each pixel was determined. The system model (Equations 1 and 2) was then applied to
determine the expected transmission T for each pixel, which was then converted to the steel equivalent
thickness S. To determine the expected reconstructed size of each object (reff and Aeff) given the pixel-
to-pixel uncertainty derived from the data each image was simulated O(1000) times, applying normally
distributed random fluctuations to each pixel according to the extracted standard deviation as a function
of cargo thickness (Figure A2). Additionally, since some source variation was still present in the images
after preprocessing [35], this effect was also simulated for the test object images. By examining the image
set, it was determined that the remaining vertical striping artifact from the source variation amounted
to an approximately 4% reduction in the reconstructed steel equivalent thickness of a given pixel in such
a stripe. Since this source variation could potentially cause dense regions to be split by the vertical
striping, these were conservatively simulated in test object images by applying a 10% reduction in the
reconstructed thickness in the stripes and modeling the stripes with the maximum width observed in data.
Additionally, the thickness thresholds chosen for the analysis were deliberately chosen to be less than the
expected thicknesses of each object to place the thresholds well below this effect. Each of these simulated
images was then processed using the same object finding algorithm as was applied to the cargo container
images to compute the expected reff and Aeff values for the objects. For the objects of interest, it was found
that the pixel-to-pixel variations led to variations of at most a few percent (except for the smallest test
objects, the 100 cm3 sample and WGPu critical mass, which varied by approximately ±0.1 cm in radius
and ±1 cm2 in area due to statistical fluctuation), and thus the mean values of reff and Aeff are quoted in
Table I. Figure A3 shows the application of this procedure for the Fetter, et al. plutonium weapon model
[27] at an object detection threshold of 25.6 cm-steel equivalent. The algorithm identifies the dense core
of the weapon (the plutonium plus the depleted uranium tamper) with the expected effective radius and
area.
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FIG. A3. Simulated radiograph of the weapons-grade plutonium weapon physics package described in Reference [27],
with the dense object identification algorithm applied at a threshold of 25.6 cm-steel equivalent. The algorithm
identifies the dense central region of the weapon above the threshold areal density (much of which is of higher areal
density than the system penetration), which contains a shell of plutonium and a depleted uranium tamper, as a
contiguous region of reff = 9.6 cm and Aeff = 272 cm
2 surrounded by the less dense chemical explosive material.
Appendix A3: Results for 40 Foot Containers
The plots presented in this section (Figures A4 and A5) present the equivalent results for 40 foot
containers as are presented for 20 foot containers in Figures A4 and A5 in the main text. As noted in
Footnote 4, 40 foot containers contain significantly fewer large, dense objects than 20 foot containers and
thus the techniques discussed for identifying threats in the main text will perform at least as well (and
in many cases significantly better) when applied to streams of 40 foot containers compared to 20 foot
containers. This result follows intuitively from the fact that the weight limit for 40 foot containers is
only slightly larger than the 20 foot container limit in most jurisdictions [43], and thus 40-foot containers
often contain spatially large/bulky, but not dense, shipments such as large pieces of equipment. As for
the 20 foot container results shown in the main article, the data shown in this section focus on effective
object thicknesses S > 20 cm-steel equivalent due to the relevance of this density range to the search for
objects resembling nuclear/radiological threats.
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FIG. A4. Fraction of 40 foot container images containing a contiguous region with effective areal density ≥S of
effective radius ≥reff, for several values of S. See Figure 3 in the main article for the equivalent figure for 20 foot
containers.
Appendix A4: Additional Results from the Radiographic Image Set
This section presents several other results from the image set that do not necessarily directly pertain
to the analysis presented in the main article, but may be of interest to those working in the fields of cargo
security and logistics. In particular, these results present information that may be useful for providing
information for priors in Bayesian analyses of cargo inspection data [51] and in giving context to previous
analyses of radiography for nuclear threat detection [25]. The results in this section include calculations
of the average cargo areal density as a function of position in containers (Figures A11 and A12) and
the distributions of the sizes of of the largest objects by container that correspond to the cumulative
distributions presented in the main text. Each result is described in the caption accompanying its figure,
along with any notes regarding interesting features of the data.
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FIG. A5. Fraction of 40 foot container images containing a contiguous region with effective areal density ≥S of
cross sectional area ≥Aeff, for several values of S. See Figure 3 in the main article for the equivalent figure for
20 foot containers.
24
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Thickness S (cm-steel equivalent)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Pi
xe
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 (n
orm
ali
ze
d)
10 -4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 P
ixe
l F
re
qu
en
cy
20 foot containers 40 foot containers
FIG. A6. Distributions of the effective areal density by pixel of the cargo, separated by 20 and 40 foot containers
(left axis) with the corresponding cumulative distributions (right axis) in units of centimeters of steel equivalent.
This figure presents the same data as Figure 2 without truncation of the y-axis. For these distributions, the portions
of the container images including the container roofs were excluded.
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FIG. A7. Distribution of the largest contiguous region by reff with effective areal density ≥S per 20 foot container,
for several values of S. Figure 3 represents unity minus the cumulative distribution of this probability distribution.
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FIG. A8. Distribution of the largest contiguous region by reff with effective areal density ≥S per 40 foot container,
for several values of S. Figure A4 represents unity minus the cumulative distribution of this probability distribution.
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FIG. A9. Distribution of the largest contiguous region by Aeff with effective areal density ≥S per 20 foot container,
for several values of S. Figure 4 represents unity minus the cumulative distribution of this probability distribution.
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FIG. A10. Distribution of the largest contiguous region by Aeff with effective areal density ≥S per 40 foot container,
for several values of S. Figure A5 represents unity minus the cumulative distribution of this probability distribution.
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FIG. A11. Mean cargo thickness in centimeters of steel equivalent as a function of position along the long axis of the
containers (measured as a fraction of the distance along the container length from the leading wall) for the 20 foot
and 40 foot image sets. Note the structure in the 20 foot data due to the common use of 48”×48”×48” palettes in
this cargo stream, while the uniformity of the 40 foot container data indicates predominantly non-palletized cargo.
In both cases, there is a slight bias towards higher densities in the central region of the containers.
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FIG. A12. Mean cargo thickness in centimeters of steel equivalent as a function of height in the containers for the
20 foot and 40 foot image sets. Both sets indicate the reasonable trend of decreasing cargo density with increasing
height in the container. Again, the 20 foot container data indicates stacks of two 48”×48”×48” palettes, while the
40 foot data shows no significant signs of palletized cargo. In each case, cargo is denser on average near the floors
of containers as would be intuitively expected.
